Nuts&Bolts: Representation in the City of Beverage
An exercise about the mechanics of how electoral systems work
The city of Beverage is politically polarized between three factions, the Bottles, the Cans and the Cups. The Bottles, Cans and Cups have sharply divergent political philosophies, and neither faction ever votes for a member of the other faction. Bottles, Cans and Cups are distributed evenly throughout the city, such that in every neighborhood 60% of the people are Bottles, 20% are Cans and 20% are Cups.
The City of Beverage is governed by a city council of five members. If the city council is elected “at-large” (that is, with no division into districts and with all voters having five votes for the citywide candidates), the Bottles are virtually certain to capture all five seats on the council. The Bottle majority will reliably vote for members of its own faction, and their 60% can outvote the minority Cans and Cups every time, for every seat, even if the Cans and Cups joined together. If the five council members are elected at-large, but “by position” (that is, with candidates filing and running for each of five separate positions, even though the whole electorate votes for all five), it is even more certain that the Bottles will outvote the Cups and Cans and capture all five seats.
To prevent such a one-sided monopoly on representation, some cities adopt district elections, dividing the city up into geographically-delineated zones that are equal in population. But in this particular city, dividing the city into five districts that elect one council member each will make no difference in the composition of the city council. That’s because the Bottles, Cans and Cups are distributed evenly throughout the city, so no matter how the districts are drawn, each district will still have a Bottle majority and will elect a Bottle as its council member, once again shutting out the Cups and Cans minorities from winning representation. Under any of the systems discussed so far, called “winner take all” voting, it is almost certain that the Bottles will in fact “win all,” and the Cans or Cups will fail to capture any seats on the council, even though they each constitute a significant minority of the city’s population.
Now suppose that the 20% Can and Cup minorities are not dispersed equally throughout the city, but each is entirely concentrated in one area of the city. In this case, if the district lines are drawn just the right way – called “gerrymandering” – so that the Can and Cup minorities become a majority in one district each, then this district-based winner-take-all method could result in a city council consisting of three Bottles, one Can, and one Cup. But the districting plan’s specific lines become all important, and the line-drawing process would likely be controlled by the Bottle majority in such a way as to reduce the Can or Cup minorities by splitting either or both the Can and Cup territories so that they don’t have a majority in any district.
However, even if the gerrymander is successful in creating a “majority-minority” district for each of the Can and Cup minorities, it’s only those Can and Cup voters living in the right district who will be able to vote for a winning candidate. All the other Can and Cup voters in the other three Bottle-majority districts become what is known as “orphaned voters” – voters without an electoral home where they can elect a candidate that reflects their viewpoint. For that matter, the Bottle voters in the majority-minority Can and Cup districts also become orphaned voters. Over time, orphaned voters realize that their candidates can’t ever win and they quit participating. Voter turnout declines.
“Broad representation” methods can make a difference
In order to elect broader representation, most of the established democracies in the world and a few local governments in the US use different voting methods than the district-based “winner take all” system. These come under the category of what is called “proportional representation” or “full representation.” Under these electoral methods, the city of Beverage would elect its five-member city council from multi-seat (rather than single-seat) districts, either city-wide or a smaller subset. Different methods can be used to ensure that the Bottles, Cans and Cups all win their fair share of representation on the city council. Here is a description of a few of these methods.
Limited voting. Under a limited voting system, each Bottle, Can and Cup voter would be permitted to vote for only one or two candidates, even though five council members will be elected citywide. Unless the Bottle majority can skillfully distribute its votes among no more than five Bottle candidates, the Can or Cup minority will have a good chance of capturing at least one seat, because the Bottle majority voters won’t have enough aggregate votes to win all five seats.
Cumulative voting. In this system, each voter is allowed five votes for five candidates running citywide, and the voter is allowed to distribute their votes in any combination she or he wishes, i.e. all five votes to a single candidate, one vote to each of five candidates, or any combination in between. Voters are able to strategically use their votes to express a strong preference for one or more candidates. By cumulating their votes for fellow Cans or Cups, the Can and Cup minorities would be very likely to elect one or two council members, as long as they don’t split their vote among too many of their own candidates.
Ranked choice voting-proportional (RCV-P). With the ranked choice voting form of proportional representation, if the Cans or Cups win 20% of the vote they are guaranteed to elect 20% -- one -- of the five seats. RCV-P is a nonpartisan form of proportional representation (though it can be used in partisan elections too) based upon the concept of “transferable ballots.” Voters pick their favorite candidates, ranking their top choice first, next choice second, next choice third, and so on. If their top choice doesn’t have enough support to win, their vote transfers to their second choice, and keeps transferring until it can help elect one of their choices.
Also, if their top choice has already been elected, their vote transfers to their next choice (though at a reduced value), and so they may see two of their favorites win. All votes are transferred until all city council seats have been filled. Like all proportional systems, if the Bottle, Can or Cup voters total 20% of the popular vote their candidate will win one of the five seats, and forty percent of the vote will win their constituency two seats, sixty percent will win three seats, and so on. RCV-P is also known by political scientists as “single transferable vote.” It truly uses every voter’s vote as precisely as necessary, and does not waste any voter’s vote.
Ranked choice voting-single winner. As a step towards RCV-P, ranked choice voting can be used to elect single winners such as district representatives. Voters rank their candidates, and if their first choice doesn’t have enough support to win, their vote moves to their next (more viable) candidate. If Beverage used this method, then the Cups and Cans voters could use the ranked ballots to prevent their constituency vote from splitting among too many “spoiler” candidates. Indeed, the Cups and Cans could mobilize the different wings of their constituency by running multiple candidates who turn out their voters. Also known as “instant runoff voting,” this method allows voters to not worry about the “lesser of two evils,” because each voter can select her/his favorite candidate without fear of unintended consequences.
Approval voting. This method allows voters to “approve” of as many candidates as they like. But in a competitive election, strategic voting is necessary. If a voter is hoping their favorite Cup candidate will win the election, but that voter also “approves”, i.e. votes for a Bottle or Can candidate, their vote for their lesser-favorite candidate could actually help defeat their favorite Cup candidate. Consequently, the candidates themselves start telling their supporters to only “bullet vote” for them. The Cup and Can voters have to be very disciplined and strategic in their voting, otherwise the Bottle majority voters could easily win all five seats again. Because of bullet voting, approval voting has a tendency to break down into a “highest vote-getter” plurality system, in which candidates in single-winner races can triumph with less than a majority of the vote.
The best democracy choices
Among all of these methods, the best method – the most representative method – for electing a legislative body is Ranked Choice Voting-Proportional. That method is the most certain to produce a city council which reflects the composition of the electorate -- three Bottles, one Can, and one Cup.
And the best method for electing single-winner positions such as mayor or governor is ranked choice voting-single winner, i.e. instant runoff voting, which will most guarantee that the will of the majority prevails, and that the Bottles, Cans and Cups voters don’t throw away their votes on spoiler candidates.
Those two methods give voters the most choice, the broadest representation and the best democratic results.
Steven Hill @StevenHill1776
My preferred voting method is Score Then Automatic Runoff (STAR) voting because most voters only know their top two favorites and the candidate they want to lose. However, I promote RCV-P and RCV/IRV because it is better known and vastly superior to single choice plurality voting.