The reform pathway for Pro Rep and Ranked Choice Voting

How do you get a city or state with millions of people to vote “yes” on changing the electoral system? Here is a guide for how to do that

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When I was the architect of the ballot measure campaign for proportional representation in San Francisco, followed a few years later by a campaign for ranked choice voting, in both campaigns I had to figure out how to get a city of nearly a million people to vote for a new democratic reform that most had never heard of. I had to convince numerous political organizations and media outlets that had deep investment in San Francisco politics to take a leap of faith on this new and untried (to them) method. The pathway to victory, which we eventually found, was in no way clear or straightforward.

Think about the four losing RCV campaigns in 2024 in Nevada, Colorado, Oregon and Idaho. The proponents had to convince populations of anywhere from 2 million to 6 million, spread across vast geographies, to vote for a ranked ballot method that most people in those states had never used. The vast majority of people who actually vote care enough about the elections process that if they are confused about a proposed ballot measure, they will usually vote “no.” So as an election reformer, your challenge is to make a majority of voters comfortable enough with your reform that they vote for your proposed change and agree to reject the status quo.

Given this situation of “information uncertainty,” political incumbents, party leaders and those opposed to change have a fairly easy task to stop reform -- simply confuse the voters enough for them to reject the proposal. I remember for the San Francisco campaign for RCV, our opponents, mostly the usual mix of political consultants and downtown business interests opposed to change, spent gobs of money to kill Proposition A. They outspent us about 10-1 with negative TV and radio ads and they mailed tens of thousands of citywide mailers, attempting to slander our efforts. One mailer showed a photo of a National Organization for Women march and said, “If Proposition A passes, women’s representation will suffer.” Just one problem – the local chapter of NOW actually had endorsed our measure, as had national woman’s leaders like Patricia Ireland and Ellie Smeal whose photos were featured on their attack mailer.

Our opponents had no shame. They were willing to do and say anything to stir up F-U-D -- Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt. That's what political reformers are up against.

Given these obstacles to passing reform, what is a viable strategy for winning proportional representation or ranked choice voting ballot measures? Here is an outline of a strategy for achieving success in targeted states or cities.

The “problem-solution” playbook

The first rule of thumb is that successful political reform is “opportunity driven” – you have to identify the problem you are trying to solve, for which you have the unique solution. This “problem-solution” framework is indispensable.

For example, in the San Francisco campaign, single-winner RCV solved a real problem: getting rid of a second “delayed runoff” election that took place in December after the November general election. By using a single “instant runoff” election in November, voters could rank their ballots and have more choice, and that in turn would get rid of spoiler dynamics, reduce negative campaigning, and save candidates as well as taxpayers the funds needed to pay for an unnecessary second election. Since December was a terrible time of the year for an election, and voter turnout usually plummeted from the November election by as much as 40%, getting rid of the December delayed runoff resulted in much higher voter turnout as well.

Given all its positives, RCV was able to win the usual support from progressive leaders, organizations and voters, but because there was a significant taxpayer savings by abolishing a second election, it also won support from fiscal moderates and conservatives who are usually more skeptical about reform. An electoral change that offered something for progressives, moderates and conservatives was a winning combination. We identified the problem, and we had the unique solution to that problem. Victory was ours.

This “problem-solution” playbook was used successfully in a number of other cities. In some places, the two election cycle was a primary election in June or March, followed by the November general election. The logic for reform was still substantially the same – “one election, instead of two.” This formula led to many victories, starting with the first victory in San Francisco in 2002, for which I ran the campaign.

Applying this lesson to proportional representation reform

While this lesson is based on single-winner RCV, it is instructive also for passing proportional representation. The question that PR advocates will have to grapple with in every city or state is: what is the “problem” being solved by the implementation of PR for which you have the unique “solution”?

The answer is undoubtedly related to important democratic values like better representation (including for partisan, geographic and racial minorities), more voter choice, higher voter turnout, possibly less toxic partisanship, improved campaign debate (with fewer “winner take all” incentives), and more. However in my experience, here’s another dilemma: first, these “good government/better democracy” values don’t always resonate deeply with either political leaders or the broad electorate. Compared to the impact of the economy or other direct impacts on personal lives, these democratic values are often second-tier concerns.

Second, elected incumbents and Democratic and GOP party leaders are likely to fight against a reform that will create more electoral competition for them, or that will change the rules that elect individual incumbents. When it comes to incumbents, “You dance with them that brung you.”

So here are strategies that I would recommend considering to overcome those obstacles:

1) A high-profile bipartisan commission within targeted states or cities. New Zealand and South Africa successfully transitioned from “winner take all” elections to PR as a result of high-profile commissions. In the UK, the Lord Jenkins commission resulted in a mixed member PR system on the ballot (though it failed to pass). In the US, Illinois had a high-profile commission that recommended Illinois return to the use of a semi-PR method known as cumulative voting (which Illinois had used for 110 years until 1980). At the local level, San Francisco put PR on the ballot in 1996 following a recommendation of a charter commission, as did Portland OR in 2022.

A high profile commission becomes a vehicle around which to organize and mobilize supporters, and build support among some political elites. It's also an easier “ask” of a legislator or governor to establish such a commission, rather than asking them to vote to directly put PR on the ballot. It allows for public hearings which are a vehicle for making the case for the “problem” and the “solution,” and to raise visibility in the media. This strategy can be pursued at the city or state level. It could even be pursued at the federal level. New York City and Portland set good examples by empowering their charter commissions to put the issue directly on the ballot, preventing self-interested city council incumbents from killing reform.

2) Build support among individual elected officials to put it on the ballot. While this strategy is not as shielded from incumbent self-interest, it worked recently in Oregon, where a Democratic-controlled legislature voted to put RCV on the statewide ballot. Important caveat: the Speaker of the House was strongly in favor of RCV because a trusted RCV advocate built a relationship with him and was able to leverage that relationship to gain support for putting it on the ballot. This strategy has worked in numerous cities, including in San Francisco, Minneapolis, Oakland and elsewhere where the city councils were convinced by advocates to put it on the ballot.

Usually the process starts with an individual legislator who decides she/he wants to champion the reform, and that legislator becomes instrumental in lining up votes from their council colleagues. That champion also becomes a focal point for grassroots mobilization efforts by RCV or PR advocates. For some legislators, the winning argument will be as simple as “Let the voters decide.” After all, incumbents have a built-in conflict of interest since the election rules affect their own re-elections. But without a legislative champion, it’s going to be hard for the reform to get much traction. This route also acts as a vehicle for building support among political elites, which will be necessary to win; and also as a vehicle for mobilizing supporters and visibility in the media.

3) For state victories, secure some city adoptions first. Before Maine adopted statewide RCV, its largest city of Portland began using RCV to elect its mayor. Maine probably would not have implemented statewide RCV without securing Portland first. A similar path could be pursued for passing either statewide RCV or PR in other states. On DemocracySOS, I previously wrote an article (link here) for how to organize campaigns to win Party List PR in any of several cities that have partisan elections. Of the 30 most populous cities in the US, eight of them have partisan elections, including New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Houston, Indianapolis, Charlotte and Louisville. New York City is larger than 38 states, Houston is larger than 14 states, Philadelphia is larger than 10 states. So wins for PR in any of these cities would be a significant step forward. And campaigns in those cities might be easier to get one’s arms around, and would likely cost less money, than in states of similar size or greater. This would be a favorable way to introduce Americans to PR democracy and then scale it to the state level. Following a few election cycles using this method at the local level, and then when combined with #1 or #2 above, there is a real chance of building momentum toward statewide PR.

4) Incubator/Accelerator to assess viability of campaigns. After developing sensible, data-driven criteria for which cities or states are the likeliest targets (more on that below), an incubator program that invites lead organizations in those states to apply to be selected as a targeted campaign could provide a valuable structure for organizing this project. Each organization would make the case in their application for why it is the best prospect. The selected organizations or states would be given seed money, as well as organizing, research and educational support by well-established reform organizations, to launch their campaigns.

5) Single subject rule. An important reason why the Alaska ballot measure in 2024 for a RCV/Top 4 open primary succeeded was that it was combined with a popular campaign finance reform measure to reign in “dark money” expenditures. This was only possible because, unlike most other states, Alaska does not require ballot measures to be restricted to a “single subject.” The winning campaign highlighted the dark money feature, not the RCV or Top 4 components of the ballot measure. This suggests a strategy for passing PR or RCV in which other states are identified that do not have a single subject rule. A PR ballot initiative could be combined with a “dark money” or some other campaign finance component that would prove to be popular with voters. But that should be done in combination with some of the other four methods listed above.

What are the criteria for state or city selection?

A related important question that any successful strategy needs to think through is figuring out which states or cities to prioritize. It’s a darn big country out there, and reform advocates need to pick and choose which are the hottest prospects for reform. Another way to ask that is: what “problem-solution” criteria will be used for establishing reform targets? Will it be a state with a history of low plurality winners? Or a state with “wrong winner” elections, in which the party receiving fewer votes at the statewide level nonetheless won a majority of seats? Will it be a city with a two-round election cycle (primary followed by November general, or November general followed by a runoff), and “one election, not two” will be a winning formula? Or a city with poor racial minority representation, or plurality at-large elections with poor geographic distribution of elected officials?

Will it be a state where there are a lot of independent voters and dissatisfaction with their exclusion from party primaries? Or frustration around the monopoly politics of one-party domination? Or widespread public frustration with a legislature perceived as “out of touch” with elite incumbents? Could any of those criteria be combined in a state that does not have a “single subject” rule?

Figuring out the specific criteria for prioritizing reform targets is crucial. And as much as possible, that process should be data-driven, with metrics developed for maximizing the best chances of success.

Popular education

In my various campaigns, developing the right metrics for identifying “the problem” and advancing “the solution” required research and drafting policy analysis and reports, and popular education materials as a way of establishing a factual basis for the problem and solution. My teams and I authored numerous policy reports and studies that made the case for reform, as well as opeds, blog posts and letters to the editor in popular forums. That wealth of data-driven public education was the foundation for building cross-partisan coalitions across a range of demographics, and of currying support from elites and engaged citizens.

Draft your legislation early

The initial impulse understandably will be to keep the educational effort fairly simple and basic without getting into details about PR or RCV. But at some point, if your effort is going to turn into an actual ballot measure, the details will need to be figured out. I have written many statutes and charter amendments for PR and RCV, and generally the process of doing this really focuses the effort. It is a crucial part of the process, because until you have drafted your legislation with all the details and bells and whistles, you really do not know how much your various audiences/constituencies actually support your effort.

I have found that many leaders and organizations will say they agree with the generic proposal, but not until you add the specific details do you learn what they really think. That’s when you find out what their real concerns are, which allows you to try and address those concerns before it’s on the ballot in order to forge a “unity proposal” in which significant constituencies have buy-in. This was another mistake made by the RCV proponents of the failing state ballot measure in Colorado, Nevada and Oregon in 2024.

Each one of the political reform efforts that I and my staff worked on, across many different states and cities, was like a puzzle that needed to be solved: what is the winning rationale for passing reform in each place? How do we frame the criteria conversations that are key to the “problem-solution” formulation?

What not to do

Those are a few of the Do’s, here are some of the Don’ts. Do not find a billionaire to write a big fat check that throws PR or RCV on the statewide ballot without first checking some of the others boxes listed above. That’s what RCV proponents did in 2024, and it ended up being the worst year in modern RCV history. Proponents grew impatient and tried to take shortcuts. I’m sure it must have been tempting, even dizzily intoxicating, to have large donors like Rupert Murdoch’s son and daughter-in-law and a wealthy former healthcare CEO offering to write big checks. RCV advocates spent close to $110 million in 2024 on all of the RCV-related statewide ballot measures in seven states. That was an unprecedented amount of money for the RCV movement, those are the types of fundraising numbers you expect to see in a highly competitive US Senate race.

And yet it all ended very badly, and now RCV is in recovery mode. Hopefully those who pushed that broken strategy have learned their lesson. Helicoptering in with suitcases of money but without much grassroots support, or without first establishing a charter commission, or winning in some city adoptions first, or building up much elite support and media support, is just a bad way to do political reform.

Steven Hill @StevenHill1776 bsky.social @StevenHill1776